Abstract-Popular content distribution is one of the key services provided by vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), in which a popular file is broadcast by roadside units (RSUs) to the onboard units (OBUs) driving through a particular area. Due to fast speeds and deep fading, some file packets might be lost during the vehicleto-roadside (V2R) broadcasting stage. In this paper, we propose a peer-to-peer (P2P) approach to allow the OBUs to exchange data and complement the missing packets. Specifically, we introduce a coalitional graph game to model the cooperation among OBUs and propose a coalition formation algorithm to implement the P2P approach. Moreover, cognitive radio (CR) is utilized for vehicle-tovehicle (V2V) transmissions so that the P2P approach does not require additional bandwidth. Simulation results show that the proposed approach performs better under various conditions, relative to the noncooperative approach, in which the OBUs share no information and simply respond to any data request from other OBUs.
vehicles entering a city on a suburban highway, a local travel company advertising the current activities in scenic areas to passing vehicles, and a traffic authority delivering real-time traffic information ahead or disseminating an updated version of local Global Positioning System maps [3] .
On the Internet, the downloading services of large files (e.g., high-definition movies) often adopt peer-to-peer (P2P) protocols, such as BitTorrent and eDonkey2000 [4] . Those P2P systems go beyond client-server systems by introducing symmetry ideas (a client may also be a server) and enjoy high performances in data rate, delay, scalability, and robustness. For PCD in VANETs, it is natural to adopt P2P ideas for improving the network performance. Since it takes usually less than a minute for moving vehicles to drive through the coverage of an RSU, OBUs may fail to download a large popular file (e.g., an advertisement video may be as large as 100 MB) directly from RSUs within the limited time for vehicle-to-roadside (V2R) transmissions. To completely download the popular file, it is not only optional but also essential for the OBUs to build a self-organizing decentralized P2P network, in which popular packets are exchanged among OBUs through vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) channels. However, those P2P techniques on the Internet should be carefully inspected before applying in the proposed PCD problem for the following reasons.
1) The wireless links in VANETs are unreliable due to both deep fading and cochannel interference, compared with the wired links on the Internet. 2) The network topology of a VANET is unpredictable and ever changing, due to the high mobility of OBUs, compared with the static topology of the Internet. Hence, P2P protocols in VANETs are no longer applicationlevel protocols based on reliable transmissions, but cross-layer protocols that jointly considers content request, peer location, channel capacity, and potential interference.
In [5] , Nandan et al. first studied cooperative downloading services in VANETs, in which they proposed SPAWN, which is a pull-based P2P content downloading protocol that extends BitTorrent. However, the peer and content selection mechanisms have high overhead and are not scalable, particularly when most of the vehicles are interested in downloading popular contents. In [3] and [6] , network coding methods were proposed, in which packets are mixed together by coding at every intermediate node and the broadcast nature of wireless medium is exploited, so that the usefulness of each coded packet is increased. In [7] , Zhang et al. focused on the link layer and proposed VC-MAC, which is a cooperative medium access control (MAC) protocol for gateway downloading scenarios in vehicular networks, to maximize the "broadcast throughput."
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In this paper, we propose a P2P approach to address the PCD problem in VANETs, in which the OBUs are allowed to exchange data and complement their missing packets. Among all the possible P2P solutions, the noncooperative approach is simple to apply, in which the OBUs share no information and response to any data request from other OBUs. However, since the transmissions are not coordinated, the noncooperative approach might be inefficient due to the collisions and repeated transmissions. Therefore, we consider introducing cooperation among OBUs, i.e., the OBUs can share some information to make the P2P approach more efficient. In particular, we adopt the coalitional graph game model as first introduced by Myerson in [8] . In a coalitional graph game, the players try to maximize their individual payoffs, which are related to the specific graph that interconnects them. This model has recently been used in many graph-based communication problems [9] . In [10] , Saad et al. investigated the problem of the formation of an uplink tree structure in the IEEE 802.16j standard with the coalitional graph game model, in which the relay stations form a directed tree graph to improve their utility considering both packet success rate and link maintenance cost. In [11] , Arcaute et al. considered a network formation game where the nodes wish to send traffic to each other, and a form of the myopic best response dynamics is proposed. In the proposed PCD problem, we introduce a coalitional graph game model considering content request, peer location, channel capacity, and network topology, and a coalition formation algorithm is proposed to implement the P2P approach based on this model.
In addition, we utilize cognitive radio (CR) for V2V transmissions in the proposed approach. In VANETs, V2V links might be blocked by the factors such as deep channel fading and severe data collisions. By exploiting CR, it is possible to utilize other available channels with better channel conditions, which, as a result, increases the sum transmission rate and reduces data collisions in the network. Therefore, CR is better for the quality of service for delay-sensitive applications. Moreover, the vehicles can easily provide sufficient power and space that are particularly needed by CR devices. In addition, in vehicular environments, particularly on suburban highways, the spectrum is relatively clean, and there are plenty of spectrum holes that can be utilized by CR. Thus, CR is beneficial in VANETs. Considering all the benefits, we utilize CR for the V2V transmissions in the P2P approach.
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce a coalitional graph game model to the PCD problem in VANETs. Based on the game theory model, a distributed coalition formation algorithm is proposed, in which the OBUs selforganize into coalitions to coordinate their V2V and vehicleto-infrastructure transmissions. Simulation results show that, using the proposed algorithm, the maximal total throughput is increased by 133% and 250%, relative to the noncooperative approach and the pure broadcasting scheme, respectively. In addition, the total possessed packets are increased by 25% and 218%, relative to the noncooperative approach and the pure broadcasting scheme, respectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the system model and the noncooperative approach. In Section III, we formulate the graph-based utility function and present a coalitional graph game for modeling the transmitting behaviors of OBUs. In Section IV, we exposes the properties of the coalitional graph game and the dynamics algorithm for forming a best response network graph. In Section V, simulation results and analysis are presented, and in Section VI, we conclude this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Network Model
Consider a VANET consisting of N OBUs driving through the coverage of an RSU. A popular content, which has been equally divided into M packets with the size of each packet s, is broadcasted at an authorized frequency band (e.g., the 75-MHz bandwidth in the 5.9-GHz band for IEEE 802.11p [12] ) from the RSU to the OBUs inside the coverage. We suppose that the V2R transmission time is not sufficient for any OBU to download the entire file but for only a few packets. Let N , M, and M i denote the set of OBUs, the set of packets, and the set of packets possessed by OBU i, respectively.
For downloading of the entire file, a P2P network is built among OBUs by unauthorized channels using CR. We suppose that there are K such channels with primary traffic modeled as K independent Poisson processes with the same arriving rate λ per time slot. In each slot, every OBU in the network transmits (or does not transmit) to another OBU through an empty channel. The OBUs keep exchanging their possessed packets until every OBU in the network achieves the entire file; formally, M i = M ∀ i ∈ N . Let K and K i denote the set of unauthorized channels and the set of unauthorized channels sensed by OBU i, respectively.
In Fig. 1 , the evolution of the popular file in an OBU is shown. When an OBU arrives in the range of the RSU, it immediately receives the broadcasted packets from the RSU. As getting out of range, it starts the P2P transmissions with other OBUs in unauthorized channels using CR. After finite P2P transmissions, the popular content can be entirely obtained by all OBUs in the network.
B. Channel Model
In this paper, we suppose that all OBUs and the RSU are equipped with a single omnidirectional antenna. The RSU periodically broadcasts the popular file at an authorized frequency with data rate R 0 . For the V2R channels between the RSU and the OBUs inside its coverage, we adopt the Rayleigh model for small-scale fading and a path-loss model with the path-loss exponent equal to 4. For simplicity without loss of generality, we do not consider the shadowing by other vehicles. In addition, we assume that, in the same slot, the channel is unchanged. Thus, the gain of the V2R channel between the RSU and any OBU i, which is denoted by h i , is given by
where α is a complex Gaussian random variable with unit variance and zero mean, and d i is the distance between the RSU and OBU i. Therefore, the capacity of the V2R channel between the RSU and OBU i, which is denoted by c i , is given by
where W is the bandwidth authorized for V2R communications and β is a scale factor representing the transmit power of the RSU. In each slot, we assume OBU i can receive useful data from the RSU if and only if c i > R 0 .
For the V2V channels, we suppose that the transmitting signal from any OBU i can be only received by its "neighbors" (the OBUs with a line of sight (LOS) to OBU i) [13] , denoted by N i . For those channels with a LOS, we adopt a similar model as the V2R channels. Thus, channel gain h k i, j between OBU i and OBU j = i in the kth unauthorized channel is given by
where d i, j is the distance between OBUs i and j, and k = 1, 2, . . . , K. Therefore, the corresponding capacity, which is denoted by c k i, j , is given by
where W k is the bandwidth of the kth channel, and β i is a scale factor representing the transmit power at OBU i. For simplicity, without loss of generality, we assume that
C. Noncooperative Approach
In the noncooperative manner, the P2P transmissions do not coordinate with each other. For any OBU i ∈ N , its packet request is broadcasted to its "neighbors" at the beginning of each slot, and the first responding OBU, e.g., OBU j, transmits the requested packets to OBU i. For finding available channels, OBU j randomly senses K j < K unauthorized channels, the set of which is denoted by K j ⊆ K and for each channel with a constant time τ . If the period of a slot is T , the transmitting time left is then T − K j τ , and the corresponding rate is given by
The channel with the largest transmission rate is selected by OBU j, which is given by
We suppose that the relation between K j and the maximum channel capacity c * j, i can be given by function f (K j ) in the average sense. The transmission rate in (6) is then rewritten as
To maximize R *
We further suppose that f (K j ) = A ln(K j + 1) and T = Kτ ; then, (8) is rewritten as
Equation (9) can be easily solved by numerical solutions, and the result can be seen as a reference value for K j . We adopt a logarithmic form as the expression of f (K j ) for the following reasons: 1) f (K j ) must be an increasing function since an extra channel can only increase or, at least, maintain the maximum capacity in average sense; and 2) f (K j ) must be a concave function since the contribution of an extra channel will be mitigated by the increasing channel number.
In the given analysis, we do not consider any data collisions, which are however inevitable. As we noted, the transmitting signal from any OBU i can be only received by its "neighbors." Thus, the signal and the interference are both confined in the "neighbors." Considering the potential collisions with primary users (the users with spectrum license) and other OBUs, the successful transmitting conditions are 1) an LOS existing between OBUs i and j, 2) no primary traffic existing in the kth channel, and 3) no "neighbors" of OBU i transmitting in the kth channel. In fact, the influence of collisions has been involved in factor A when we suppose that f (K j ) = A ln K j , which makes no difference in the result.
III. COALITIONAL GRAPH GAME MODEL
For the proposed PCD problem, we have provided a noncooperative solution, in which the sensing-throughput tradeoff has been locally optimized. However, due to the random establishment of V2V links, the OBUs may be connected to inefficient "neighbors" or may not be connected to any "neighbor." Thus, the entire network may suffer from low data throughput or, equivalently, high transmission delay. Here, we introduce a coalitional graph game model to coordinate the V2V links between different OBUs and the V2R links from the RSU to the OBUs. In this model, each OBU decides to connect to or be connected to other OBUs to maximize its own utility that takes into account data throughput and link maintaining cost. The result of the interactions among the OBUs is a directed graph G(V, E), with V denoting the set of all nodes (the OBUs and the RSU) and E denoting the set of all edges (V2V links and V2R links). For any i, j ∈ V, we say that the link from i to j exists if e i, j ∈ E.
A. Utility Function
For any OBU i ∈ N , we suppose that positive utilities can be extracted from both the effective packets received from and transmitted to other OBUs, which depends on the current links associated with OBU i. Thus, the utility function is a graph-based function, which is denoted by U i (G). Due to the single antenna, the maximum number of connections from or to OBU i is confined to 1, which implies the out-degree λ The corresponding utility of the received packets, which is denoted by U in i (G), is assumed to be proportional to the number of received packets, which is given by
where
represents the set of missing packets that OBU j can offer to OBU i, γ in > 0 is a pricing factor, and P j, i is the probability of successful transmission from OBU j to OBU i, the expression of which will be given in the following. The corresponding utility of the transmitted packets, which is denoted by U out i (G), is assumed to be proportional to the number of transmitted packets, which is given by
where γ out > γ in is a pricing factor, and P i, j is the probability of successful transmission from OBUs i to j, the expression of which will be given in the following. The main driver behind the transmitting benefit is that the importance of the role of OBU i increases if OBU i serves more OBUs; thus, its utility should increase. When OBU i transmits or receives data, certain channels are occupied, which increases the probability of data collisions. The cost of potential collisions is proportional to the number of OBUs that has been interfered. For the link from OBU i, the interference is confined in OBU i's "neighbors" N i . For the link from OBUs j to i, the interference is confined in OBU j's "neighbors" N j . Thus, the cost function, which is denoted by
where γ cost > 0 is a pricing factor.
In summary, given transmission graph G(V, E), the cost and benefit of OBU i ∈ N are captured by the following utility function:
B. Collisions
For any given unauthorized channel k ∈ K and any OBU i ∈ N , the probability of miss (i.e., probability of missing the detection of the primary traffic) and that of false alarm (i.e., probability of the false detection of the primary traffic) are denoted by P i m (k) and P i f (k), respectively. For simplicity without loss of generality, we suppose that the sensing devices in all OBUs have the same performance for any channels, which implies
As we noted, the primary traffic in any channel k is modeled as a Poisson process with parameter λ. Thus, the probability that no primary traffic occupies channel k is denoted by P 0 = e −λ . We consider the probability of successful transmission from OBUs i to j, which is denoted by P i, j . For a successful transmission, the link from OBUs i to j should not be interfered by other OBUs, which implies that none of OBU j's "neighbors" is transmitting at the same channel. In the average sense, there are P 0 K channels available for V2V transmission, and OBU i occupies one of them. Thus, the probability that OBU j's neighbors do not transmit at the same channel is given by
We denote by H 1 the hypothesis that the unauthorized channel is occupied by a primary user in real and by H 0 the alternative hypothesis. In addition, we denote by H 1 the hypothesis that the sensing result shows that the unauthorized channel is occupied, and H 0 by the alternative hypothesis. Thus, the possibility that the empty decision of the unauthorized channel is correct can be expressed by
where (15) is also the probability that the transmission from OBUs i to j does not collide with primary traffic; we rewrite this probability as
Thus, the probability of successful transmission from OBUs i to j is given by
which completes the expressions of (10) and (11), respectively.
IV. NETWORK FORMATION ALGORITHM
Here, we propose a myopic dynamics algorithm for the coalitional graph game, which results in a directed graph that coordinates the transmissions in the network. Myopic dynamics refer to the property of the dynamics that, at any given round, nodes update their strategic decisions only to optimize their current utility, in contrast to dynamics that consider some longterm objective [11] . We show that the proposed algorithm is a distributed and localized algorithm that results in a local Nash network, which adapts to the environmental changes.
A. Network Formation Algorithm
The proposed network formation algorithm is distributively carried out by each OBU in the network. Given the transmission graph G (V, E) , the available strategies any OBU i ∈ N are classified as follows.
1) Offer OBU j = i a new link e i, j if λ Note that the proposed algorithm focuses on maximizing the current utility U i of OBU i, some of the strategies in S i may be infeasible for reducing the utilities of corresponding OBUs. For strategies that only involves in breaking down old links (e.g., items 2 and 4), the utility U i of OBU i should be improved or, at least, maintained the same. For strategies that are involved in forming new links (e.g., items 1 and 3), both the utility U i of OBU i and the utility U j of OBU j should be improved or, at least, maintained the same. Thus, we give the following definition.
Definition 1: A local strategy s i = (a i , b i ) ∈ S i is a feasible local strategy for OBU i ∈ N with state (a i , b i ) if and only if: 
Thus, the local best response for OBU i is to select the links that maximize its utility, given that the other OBUs maintain their vector of strategies.
We assume that each OBU is myopic, in the sense that the OBUs aim at improving their utilities considering only the current state of the network. Several models for myopic dynamics have been considered in the literature [15] [16] [17] . Here, we propose a myopic dynamics algorithm composed of indefinite number of rounds, where in each round, all OBUs in N update their local best responses by random priority. If the algorithm converges to a final graph G * (V, E * ) after finite rounds, we adopt G * to coordinate the transmissions in the network, i.e., node i (OBU i or the RSU) transmits to OBU j if and only if e i, j ∈ E * .
B. Convergence and Stability
Having an analytical proof for the convergence of network formation games, particularly with practical utilities and discrete network formation strategies, is difficult [17] , [18] . In fact, in wireless applications [19] [20] [21] , it is common to propose best response algorithms without any analytical proof of convergence since such algorithms can, in most cases, converge.
If the proposed algorithm converges to a final graph G * , we define the following concept [15] .
Definition 3: A network graph G, in which no node i can improve its utility by a unilateral change in its feasible local strategy s i ∈ F i , is a local Nash network.
Lemma 1: The final graph G * resulting from the proposed algorithm is a local Nash network.
Proof: When the proposed algorithm converges to a final graph G * (V, E * ), any strategy s i that OBU i ∈ N maintains must be the local best response s * i . Thus, we have
from the definition of the local best response. In consequence, there is no OBU i ∈ N that can improve its utility by a unilateral change in its feasible local strategy s i ∈ F i . Hence, the final graph G * is a local Nash network.
In the case of nonconvergence, the proposed algorithm may cycle between a number of networks. To avoid such undesirable cycles, one can introduce additional constraints on the strategies such as allowing the nodes to select their strategies not only based on the current network but also on the history of moves or strategies taken by the other nodes. In [22] , Saad et al. allow the nodes to observe the visited networks during the occurrence of network formation. By setting up an upper bound for the occurrence number of a particular network, those potential cycles could be broken, and the proposed game can converge. This constraint needs every node to be aware of the topology of the entire network, which is not a big problem in [22] since the nodes are relay stations with fixed locations and high transmitting power. However, in our scenario, where the nodes are OBUs with high mobility and limited transmitting power, it is difficult for every OBU to achieve the entire topology within a slot-level period. Therefore, in our proposed algorithm, we allow the OBUs to count for each used strategy and set an upper bound for it. Formally, we define history function h t i (s i ), which represents, for every used strategy s i ∈ S i (note that the strategy space is now S i ), the number of times that this strategy was used by OBU i in the past t iterations. Further, we define threshold σ (positive integer) for h t i (s i ), above which OBU i is no longer interested in adopting this strategy since it may lead to a cyclic behavior. Thus, at any iteration t + 1, there is an additional step for any OBU i ∈ N , which is to update the set of its feasible strategies by
where F i is the original set of feasible strategies defined in Definition 1. The proposed algorithm with strategy constraint is summarized in Table I . By adding the strategy constraint to the algorithm, the coalitional graph game will converge after finite iterations, which is guaranteed by the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Given any initial network graph G 0 , there exists a positive integer T that the proposed algorithm with a strategy constraint will converge after T iterations.
Proof: Suppose that the algorithm does not converge after T iterations. In this regard, denoting by G t the graph reached at the end of any iteration t, the proposed algorithm consists of a graph sequence such as the following:
According to the pigeonhole principle, there exists graph G x (V, E x ) that occurs more than T /|G| times, where G =
{G(V, E)|∀
≤ 1} denotes the set of all possible network graphs. Again, according to the pigeonhole principle, there exists an OBU x ∈ N that uses strategy s x = (a x , b x ) more than T /(|G|N ) times, where e a x , x , e x, b x ∈ E x . We suppose that T = |G|N (σ + 1). Then, after T iterations, an OBU x ∈ N and one of its strategy s x ∈ S x exit, where the corresponding history function satisfying
which contradicts to our constraint. Thus, the proposed algorithm with a strategy constraint must converge after T iterations, where T is a finite number.
C. Scalability and Adaptation to Environmental Changes
The proposed algorithm in Table I adopts a distributed approach to form a network graph, which coordinates all transmissions for the proposed PCD application. By carefully inspecting the utility function U i (G) in (13), we find that, for calculating U i (G), the topology of transmission graph G is not essential. All information that OBU i needs can be achieved from OBU i's "neighbors" N i , which includes channel conditions, the possessed packets of "neighbors," and the number of a "neighbor's neighbors." Moreover, the strategy constraint that we introduce can also be performed in a localized manner. Hence, the proposed algorithm is a localized approach with overhead only between "neighbors," which is, therefore, a scalable algorithm.
In the proposed PCD problem, the myopic dynamics algorithm is repeated periodically every slot, which allows the OBUs to take autonomous decisions to update the transmission topology adapting to any environmental changes. As the slot is chosen to be shorter, the proposed algorithm is played more often, allowing better adaptability. Moreover, as the environmental changes mitigate, we can expect that the change of the final transmission graph also mitigates, which implies less complexity in calculation since the transmission graph will be inherited by the next slot.
In the proposed algorithm, the OBU selects its transmitting channel individually without any coordination, which may introduce, when the network is dense, considerable interference. To avoid the potential collisions, interference management can be introduced, e.g., the cooperative approach in [23] , where each node assigns different weights on the channels and cooperatively sort their channels, in a manner to reduce interference as much as possible. We do not introduce such management for the following reasons.
1) The proposed PCD problem is in highway scenarios, where the spectrum is relatively clean and the traffic flow is not heavy. Thus, the interference management may be unnecessary. 2) To implement the cooperative interference management, each node needs to share its information with the entire network, which ruins the localized property of our algorithm.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Here, the performance of the proposed algorithm in Table I is simulated in various environmental conditions, compared with the pure broadcasting scheme, the noncooperative approach, and the optimal solution. Here, the pure broadcasting is a scheme in which no V2V transmission is allowed, and all the OBUs can only receive from the RSU. The pure broadcasting scheme can be seen as a lower bound for evaluating all possible P2P approaches. In addition, we give an upper bound with the optimal solution, in which the overall information has been considered, and an optimal solution has been derived by enumeration. The mobility model and system parameters are presented in the following.
A. Mobility Model and System Parameters
The mobility model that we use is similar to the Freeway Mobility Model proposed in [14] , which is well accepted for modeling the traffic in highway scenarios. In the FFM, the simulation area includes many multiple lane freeways without intersections. At the beginning of the simulation, the vehicles are randomly placed in the lanes and move at history-based speeds. The vehicles randomly accelerate or decelerate with the security distance d min > 0 maintained between two subsequent vehicles in the same lane, and no change of lanes is allowed.
In our scenario, the map has been simplified to a one-way traffic road with double lanes, as shown in Fig. 1 . All the OBUs independently choose to speed up or slow down by probability p and acceleration a > 0. The velocity of any OBU i ∈ N is limited by v min ≤ v i (t) ≤ v max for all time. To better reflect the changing topology of VANETs, we decide to allow the change of lanes when a vehicle is overtaking, as long as the security distance is maintained. In addition, to prevent the vehicles from being widely scattered, we also give an upper bound d max for the distance between any two subsequent vehicles in the same lane. The overall constraints in our mobility model are listed as follows.
1) The OBUs are randomly placed on both lanes in an area with length L that is D away form the RSU when the simulation begins.
2) The initial speed of OBU i ∈ N , which is denoted by
where p is the probability of acceleration or deceleration. 4) For any OBU i ∈ N with OBU j 1 ahead in the same lane and OBU j 2 ahead in the other lane, OBU i switches to the other lane if
The parameters are taken from a general highway scenario, as shown in Table II.   TABLE II  PARAMETERS 
B. Simulation Results
In Fig. 2 , we show the total throughput as a function of time for networks with N = 10, K = 10, and K = 4. Let P (t) = i∈N |M i | denote the total possessed packets in the network. Then, the total throughput is given by dP (t)/dt, which represents the packets that successfully delivered at current slot t. For pure broadcasting scheme, the total throughput increases as the OBUs enter the communication range of the RSU and then decreases to zero as the OBUs leave this area. By introducing V2V transmissions as in the proposed approach and the noncooperative approach, the total throughput is largely increased. Even after the OBUs completely leave the RSU area, the packets can still be exchanged among the OBUs, and the total throughput is still above zero. Further, by introducing cooperation among OBUs, the proposed approach reduces the probability of collision and avoids repeated transmissions, relative to the noncooperative approach, and, thus, performs better in total throughput. In particular, Fig. 2 shows that, using the proposed cooperative approach, the maximal total throughput is increased by 133% and 250%, relative to the noncooperative approach and pure broadcasting approach, respectively. Note that, as more packets are delivered in the network, the OBUs become less willing to exchange data, and the potential throughput for V2V transmissions decreases. The total throughput of the optimal solution may fall below other methods, and our proposed approach may fall below the noncooperative approach, which is particularly seen from slot 50 to slot 100 in Fig. 2 .
In Fig. 3 , we show the sensing-throughput tradeoff by setting different K from 1 to K in both the noncooperative approach and the proposed algorithm. As we can see, the value of K with the best performance occurs at K = 4−5, which coordinates to our reference value given in (9) . Thus, the best spectrum sensing time K τ can be individually decided by simple numerical solutions. Note that, even when K = K = 10, which means that no time is left for V2V transmissions, the OBUs can still receive data from the RSU. The total possessed packets P (t = 100) is above zero for any K ≤ K, as shown in Fig. 3 .
In Fig. 4 , we show the performance of the proposed algorithm with different numbers of CR channels for V2V trans- missions. Here, the parameter K , representing the number of sensed channels, has been chosen to satisfy (9) . As we can see, the number of total possessed packets is highly affected by the cognitive spectrum. Therefore, we can expect a considerable performance improvement, when we apply CR for V2V transmissions, particularly in highway scenarios with plenty of spectrum holes.
In Fig. 5 , we show the performance of the proposed algorithm with different network sizes. Note that the total possessed packets increase linearly with the network size. We have that the average possessed packets of each OBU is a stable constant with different network sizes, which implies that the proposed algorithm is scalable and that its performance is stable. This coordinates with our analysis in Section IV-C, in which we point out that the overhead of the proposed approach is localized. As shown in Fig. 5 , when the network is large (N = 50), the total possessed packets of the proposed cooperative approach are increased by 25% and 218%, relative to the noncooperative approach and the pure broadcasting approach, respectively. When the network becomes smaller, the advantage gradually declines. In extremely sparse networks, as shown in Fig. 5 when N converges to 1, there are few V2V transmissions, and therefore, all three P2P approaches degenerate to the pure broadcasting scheme. Note that the centralized optimal solution is shown for up to N = 10 since it is mathematically intractable for larger networks.
In Fig. 6 , we show the convergence performance of the proposed approach to networks with N = 5, 10, 15; K = 10; and K = 4. In Section IV-B, we have proven the convergence of the proposed algorithm. As we can see, the proposed approach converges in a fast speed with different network sizes. In addition, we can see that the average possessed packets converge to different values with different network sizes. On the one hand, denser networks have more chance for V2V transmissions and, thus, bring more missing packets to the OBU after sufficient iterations of our proposed algorithm. On the other hand, since there is a minimal distance constraint between any two subsequent vehicles, the network cannot be infinitely dense; thus, the converging value of average possessed packets cannot be infinitely large. We can see that the gap between N = 15 and N = 10 is considerably smaller than the gap between N = 5 and N = 10, which stands for a limited converging value when N is infinite.
In addition, if the iteration number is denoted by I, we have the overall complexity of the proposed algorithm as O(NI). Since the proposed algorithm is distributed and the overall complexity is shared by all OBUs, the calculation complexity of each OBU is O(I), which linearly increases with the iteration number. Thus, Fig. 6 also shows the performance of the proposed algorithm as a function of the calculation complexity of each OBU, where the performance rapidly converges to the maximal value as the individual calculation complexity increases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have addressed the PCD problem in VANETs, in which the RSU broadcasts a popular file to the passing OBUs, but the OBUs fail to receive some packets due to high speeds and channel fading. To support reliable transmissions, we have proposed a P2P approach based on a coalitional graph game to allow the OBUs to exchange data and complement the missing packets. Specifically, we have introduced a coalitional graph game to model the OBUs and have proposed a coalition formation algorithm to implement the P2P approach. The convergence of the proposed algorithm has been proven, and the overhead has been localized for arbitrary network sizes. In addition, CR has been utilized to perform the P2P transmissions over unlicensed channels, and the sensing-throughput tradeoff has been analyzed, in which the optimal number of sensed channels K satisfies (K + 1) ln(K + 1) + K = K, where K is the number of potential channels. The simulation results show that, by introducing cooperation among OBUs in a coalitional graph game model, the maximal total throughput is increased by 133% and 250%, relative to the noncooperative approach and the pure broadcasting scheme, respectively. In addition, for networks in a large scale, the total possessed packets of our proposed algorithm can be increased by 25% and 218%, relative to the noncooperative approach and the pure broadcasting scheme, respectively.
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